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STUDENT NOTES
LABOR LAW-INJUNCTIONS-THE ROLE
OF THE COURTS IN THE RESOLUTION
OF LABOR DISPUTES
In the summer of 1976, the United States Supreme Court
further defined the proper role of the federal courts in the resolu-
tion of industrial disputes. Specifically, the Court decided when
injunctive relief is proper for the enforcement of no-strike promises
in collective bargaining agreements. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers of America' is an illustration of some of the basic
principles of federal labor policy, and their application by the
Court. After a brief discussion of the historical background of the
role of federal injunctions in labor disputes, Buffalo Forge and its
implications will be analyzed.
During the first thirty years of this century, struggles between
organized labor and management frequently and decisively were
settled in managements' favor by use of the labor injunction.2 At
the request of management, federal courts consistently enjoined
concerted activities of labor unions' in a manner characterized by
abuses which brought the federal judiciary into disrepute.4 Injunc-
tions were often issued in ex parte proceedings on the basis of
vague and generalized affidavits, and decrees were often sweeping
in scope.5 The temporary or interlocutory injunction usually ended
the union's activity permanently,' with violations of the decrees
96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Buffalo Forge].
2 F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
Whether the federal judiciary was simply anti-union and pro-management,
or whether the abuses resulted from lack of an established substantive policy con-
cerning labor disputes, or an interplay of these factors, the result was the same;
injunctions were consistently granted. Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpreta-
tion and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J.
1547, 1553 nn.15 & 16 (1963)[hereinafter cited as Wellington].
Id. at 1554 & n.17.
Id. at 1554; Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the Judges: The Boys
Markets Case, 1970 SUPREME CouBT REVIEw 215, 234 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Gould].
' "[A]t this stage in history most concerted union activity was unable to
survive an initial injunction." Wellington, supra note 3, at 1554-55. Furthermore,
the judiciary exhibited a general unwillingness to reverse those temporary orders
which did reach the permanent injunction stage. Gould, supra note 5, at 234.
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being punished by contempt penalties issued against both individ-
ual employees and union representatives. 7 This indiscriminate use
of federal labor injunctions resulted in the passage of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in 1932,8 whose stated policy was to guarantee free-
dom of association of workers, protection from coercion by their
employers, and protection of concerted activities.' The policy was
effected by provisions which removed the jurisdiction of federal
courts to issue injunctions in many labor disputes," and which
imposed strict procedural requirements in those cases where in-
junctions were permissible."
The enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the National
Labor Relations Act, also known as the Wagner Act,12 significantly
increased the power of unions, and Congress became concerned
with controlling industrial strife which was hampering the nation's
economy.'3 This concern was manifested in the enactment of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, also known as the Taft-
Hartley Act." The act blunted the force of unions by designating
some union tactics as unfair labor practices.'5 Section 301(a) of the
I Gould, supra note 5, at 234; Wellington, supra note 3, at 1554. Trial was
summary, without benefit of jury, and frequently before the judge who issued the
injunction.
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
10 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970) provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restrain-
ing order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons partici-
pating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined)
from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in,
any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or
by any other method not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion
of their interests in a labor dispute;...
29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).
12 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
22 Note, The Applicability of Boys Markets Injunctions to Refusals to Cross a
Picket Line, 76 COL. L. REv. 113 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Applicability of
Injunctions]. This is an excellent and concise analysis of the problems leading up
to Buffalo Forge. See also 19 L.R.R.M. 49 (1947).
24 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited in LMRA]. This act was
a series of amendments to the National Labor Relations Act.
5 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
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LMRA'6 opened the jurisdiction of federal courts to suits for viola-
tion of collective bargaining agreements, without respect to diver-
sity of citizenship or amount in controversy, and thus served the
purpose of providing a forum for the enforcement of collective bar-
gaining agreements by supplementing state court jurisdiction.'"
Subsequent to the enactment of the LMRA, a split of author-
ity developed among the circuit courts of appeals as to whether §
301(a) was merely a jurisdictional provision or a source of substan-
tive law as well.'" The solution was provided in the landmark case
of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills'" in which a labor union
brought suit under § 301(a) seeking specific performance of arbi-
tration provisions contained in a collective bargaining agreement.
The Court held that § 301(a) was substantive in nature and that
"[tihe substantive law to [be applied] in suits under § 301(a) is
federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our
national labor laws.""0 The Court determined that the policy of the
LMRA was to foster peaceful industrial relations by making collec-
tive bargaining agreements enforceable by either party,2' that Con-
gress favored no-strike agreements, 2 and that an agreement to
11 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970) provides in part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the par-
ties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.
11 It was difficult to serve process on unions in state courts governed by com-
mon law, as unions were unincorporated associations. Of course, it was no problem
to serve process on a business corporation or other employer. Keene, The Supreme
Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and
Beyond, 15 VML. L. Rav. 32, 34 (1969).
"S See cases cited in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, nn.1
& 2 (1957). Writing a plurality opinion in Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), Justice Frankfurter
expressed the opinion that § 301 was merely jurisdictional in nature.
1" 353 U.S. 448 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Lincoln Mills].
2 Id. at 456. The mandate given federal courts to "fashion" the substantive
law was followed by suggested guidelines: "The Labor Management Relations Act
expressly furnishes some substantive law .... Other problems will lie in the pen-
umbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but
will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy
that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be deter-
mined by the problem." Id. at 457.
21 Id. at 453-54.
1 Id. at 453.
[Vol. 79
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arbitrate grievance disputes was the quid pro quo for an agreement
not to strike?2 The Court noted that the procedural proscriptions
on the issuance of injunctions in § 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 2
did not apply to an order to enforce an agreement to arbitrate.
because "[tihe failure to arbitrate was not part and parcel of the
abuses against which the Act was aimed."" It was also noted that
§ 8 of the act 26 encouraged arbitration;2' specific performance of the
agreement to arbitrate was thus ordered and became federal law.2
The great significance of Lincoln Mills is the authority which the
Court assumed to "fashion" federal labor law.2 1
Arbitration was firmly established as the favored means for
resolution of industrial disputes in the Steelworkers Trilogy of
1960.11 Both the American Manufacturing and Warrior & Gulf
cases of the Trilogy involved § 301(a) suits brought by unions
seeking enforcement of arbitration agreements provided in collec-
tive bargaining contracts, which also contained express no-strike
clauses. The proper role of the courts was held to be "very limited
when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract
interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining
whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on
its face is governed by the contract.""1 If the parties agreed to
arbitrate, the court will not consider the merits of the grievance
because it is the arbitrator's judgement that was bargained for, not
that of the court.2 2 And "[a]n order to arbitrate the particular
grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an inter-
pretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be re-
solved in favor of coverage." The federal judiciary was thus in-
21 Id. at 455.
21 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).
353 U.S. at 458.
21 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1970).
353 U.S. at 458.
" An order to enforce arbitration provisions is the counterpart to an order
enjoining a work-stoppage.
Gould, supra note 5, at 232.
United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960) [hereinafter cited as American Manufacturing]; United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Warrior & Gulf]; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Enterprise Wheel and Car].
, 363 U.S. 564, 567-68.
22 Id. at 568.
363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (footnote omitted).
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structed to refrain from usurping the arbitrator's function, and to
apply a presumption of arbitrability in doubtful cases. 4
State courts were held to have concurrent jurisdiction over §
301(a) suits." In Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.,3" the
Court reviewed an award of damages made by a state court against
a union for breach of a no-strike clause contained in a collective
bargaining agreement. Because "[t]he ordering and adjusting of
competing interests through a process of free and voluntary collec-
tive bargaining is the keystone of the federal scheme to promote
industrial peace . . . " the Court held that state courts were to
apply doctrines of substantive federal law in § 301(a) suits. Al-
though the collective bargaining agreement at issue did not con-
tain an express no-strike clause, the Court held as a matter of
federal law that when the parties have agreed to final and binding
arbitration there arises an implied duty not to strike over those
matters subject to arbitration. 8
The federal labor policy articulated in § 301(a) cases was to
foster peaceful industrial relations through enforcement of volun-
tary collective bargaining agreements, and to promote arbitration
as an alternative to economic warfare. The question remained
whether this policy was a basis upon which federal courts could
enforce the preferred no-strike clause (express or implied) against
a labor union by use of an injunction. The tension between this
policy and the anti-injunction prohibitions of § 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was resolved in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,"
which involved a § 301(a) suit by an employer seeking to enjoin
repeated work stoppages which were over grievances subject to the
mandatory arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement between the parties, and which were also in violation
of an express no-strike clause. The Court held that although the
strikes were a violation of the collective bargaining agreement,
they involved a labor dispute within the meaning of § 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and therefore injunctive relief was prohib-
3 Id. In Enterprise Wheel & Car, supra note 30, the Court held that questions
of contract interpretation were for the arbitrator to decide, not the courts, and that
even though an opinion accompanying an arbitrator's award is ambiguous, the
court will not overrule it. 363 U.S. 593, 597-98.
3 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
31 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
v Id. at 104.
31 Id. at 105-06.
21 370 U.S. 195 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Sinclair].
[Vol. 79
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ited.4 0 The Court reasoned that the meaning of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was clear, that it was drafted with the broadest
possible terms so as to avoid a restrictive judicial construction,"
and that the legislative history of § 301 showed that Congress,
considered repealing the Norris-LaGuardia Act "insofar as suits
based upon breach of collective bargaining agreements are con-
cerned and deliberately chose not to do So.''12
In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan argued that "Norris-
LaGuardia does not invariably bar injunctive relief when necessary
to achieve an important objective of some other statute in the
pattern of labor laws." 3 In light of the federal labor policy, Justice
Brennan deemed it necessary to accomodate the underlying pur-
poses of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and § 301 of the LMRA.4'
Accomodation of § 4 and § 301 would show that the availability of
injunctive relief in this factual setting was more necessary to the
purposes of § 301 than harmful to the purposes of § 4,45 and that
simply to adhere to a literal interpretation of § 4 would disrupt the
basic policies favoring arbitration6 and deny the employer his bar-
gain."7
Sinclair was overruled eight years later in Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770.11 The parties in Boys Markets
entered a collective bargaining agreement which provided that all
:0 Id. at 199, 203.
" Id. at 203.
42 Id. at 205 (footnote omitted). The Court also distinguished Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen u. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1960) (injunc-
tion not barred by § 4 where the parties were bound to compulsory arbitration by
the Railway Labor Act); and Lincoln Mills, supra note 19 (injunction held not to
violate § 4 because the order issued did not violate one of the specific prohibitions
of § 4). 370 U.S. at 211-12.
43 370 U.S. 195, 217 (Brennan, J., dissenting opinion).
" Id. at 218.
'1 Id. at 218-19.
11 Id. at 227.
,1 Id. at 219. The result would be that an employer would be bound to the
arbitration provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement under § 301, but he
could not enforce the no-strike clause through an injunction. It was felt that this
would discourage employers from entering agreements with arbitration provisions.
Id. at 227.
Another problem raised by the dissent was the potentially harmful effect the
Court's holding would have on the policy of maintaining state court jurisdiction
while promoting uniformity of doctrine. Id. at 226.
A 398 U.S. 235 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Boys Markets]. See Gould, supra
note 5; Note, The New Federal Law of Labor Injunctions, 79 YALE L.J. 1593 (1970).
6
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disputes as to the application or interpretation of the contract
should be resolved by binding arbitration and that there should be
no work stoppages." When a dispute arose over a work assignment,
the union refused to abide by the grievance and arbitration provi-
sions and called a strike. This was the factual setting upon which
the Court achieved the accommodation of § 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and § 301 of the LMRA that was called for in
Justice Brennan's Sinclair dissent. The Court held that § 4 did not
prohibit a federal court from enjoining a strike in breach of a
collective bargaining agreement that contained provisions for
binding arbitration of the dispute over which the strike was
called.', The Court reasoned that national labor policy favored
peaceful, voluntary settlement of disputes, and that a central insti-
tution in maintenance of this policy was arbitration. 1
The holding in Sinclair undermined this policy because denial
of injunctive relief often deprived employers of the only effective
means to enforce a no-strike clause, and therefore discouraged
employers from entering agreements with arbitration provisions
which could be enforced against them." Alternatively, the major
underlying purposes of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were
viewed as responsive to the situation labor organizations faced
before the passage of that act. 3 The Court concluded that limiting
the use of the injunctive remedy to only. when it is necessary to
promote the policy favoring arbitration did not vitiate the core
purposes of Norris-LaGuardia."
Characterizing the holding as "narrow," 5 the Court adopted
a statement of principles from the Sinclair dissent as to when
injunctive relief would be appropriate:
"A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not
grant injunctive relief against concerted activity unless and
' 398 U.S. at 238-39.
Id. at 253.
5' Id. at 252.
£2 Id. at 248, 252.
Id. at 250. See the text accompanying notes 2-11 supra.
Id. at 253. The Court based its holding on the additional line of reasoning
that Sinclair defeated the purpose of § 301(a) to supplement state court jurisdic-
tion. See note 44 supra. In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), the
Court held that suits under § 301(a) could be removed to federal court. "The
principal practical effect of Avco and Sinclair taken together is nothing less than
to oust state courts of jurisdiction in § 301(a) suits where injunctive relief is sought
for breach of a no-strike obligation." 398 U.S. at 244-45.
Id. at 253.
[Vol. 79
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until it decides that the case is one in which an injunction would
be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a
strike is sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance
which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, the
District Court may issue no injunctive order until it first holds
that the contract does have that effect; and the employer should
be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an in-
junction against the strike. Beyond this, the District Court
must, of course, consider whether issuance of an injunction
would be warranted under ordinary principles of equity . . .
and whether the employer will suffer more from the denial of
an injunction than will the union from its issuance."56
Federal courts were once again in the business of ending strikes by
injunction.
The Court upheld the issuance of a Boys Markets injunction
under the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968 in
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,57 the first case subse-
quent to Boys Markets in which § 301 injunctions were considered.
In Gateway Coal, the agreement contained a broad arbitration
provision, but did not have a no-strike clause." The Court held
that the Steelworkers Trilogy presumption of arbitrability applied
to the safety dispute at issue in this case, and, therefore, that the
dispute fell within the scope of the broad arbitration clause. 9 This
duty to arbitrate gave rise to a "coterminous" obligation not to
strike,"0 and since traditional equity requirements were satisfied,
a Boys Markets injunction was proper." Gateway Coal illustrates
how synthesis of prior § 301 holdings can result in issuance of an
injunction based upon the presence of a broad arbitration provi-
sion alone.
m Id. at 254, quoting 370 U.S. 195, 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting opinion). Jus-
tice Black, joined by Justice White, dissented on the grounds that Sinclair was
correctly decided. Justice Stewart, who had been in the majority in Sinclair,
switched positions and joined the majority in Boys Markets.
37 414 U.S. 368 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Gateway Coa].
Id. at 375-76.
' Id. at 377-79. But see Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Pre-
sumption of Arbitrability, 85 HIARv. L. Rxv. 636 (1972), (arguing that the presump-
tion of arbitrability should not apply in injunction cases); Comment, Labor Law-
Arbitration of Safety Disputes, 76 W. VA. L. Rav. 249 (1974).
'* 414 U.S. at 382. The Court noted that a contract could have a broad arbitra-
tion provision while expressly negating any implied no-strike duty, if the parties so
intended.
61 Id. at 387.
8
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The most widely litigated issue to arise in the wake of Boys
Markets was whether the holding in that case provided federal
courts authority to enjoin a work-stoppage caused by the refusal
of employees to cross the picket line of another union,"2 and a con-
flict of authority soon developed in the circuit courts of appeals
over this issue. 3 Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters"'
illustrates the typical fact situation involved in these cases, and it
is representative of one approach taken. A work stoppage resulted
when the union refused to cross a picket line set up by another
union. The company sought a Boys Markets injunction, claiming
that the work stoppage was a violation of the express no-strike
promise in the collective bargaining contract to which the union
was a party, and stated that it was willing to arbitrate the scope
of the no-strike clause. The court denied the injunction because
the work stoppage was not the result of a dispute "over an arbitra-
ble grievance" and therefore the case was "entirely outside the
scope of the exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act delineated in
Boys Markets."65
The other basic approach taken is exemplified by Monon-
gahela Power Co. v. IBEW Local 2332.6 When the Clarksburg,
West Virginia, division employees went on strike they established
pickets at the Panhandle division in Weirton, West Virginia, and
the picket line was honored by the Panhandle employees. The
company sought to enjoin the work stoppage by the Panhandle
employees alleging that the stoppage was a breach of the no-strike
obligation in the contract, and that the dispute was subject to the
broad grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract. The
court held that the dispute as to whether the union had waived its
right to honor the picket line by the no-strike clause was arbitrable
and within the holding of Boys Markets.7
As has been shown, most of the cases have been decided either
by holding that a sympathy strike is not "over an arbitrable griev-
42 A refusal to cross a picket line is a protected activity under the LMRA. 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(1970). This right may be bargained away by the union. NLRB
v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
" For a concise analysis of the treatment of this issue in the circuit courts, see
Applicability of Injunctions, supra note 12.
, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1373. The Sixth Circuit has also followed this approach. Plain Dealer
Pub. Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union #53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975).
" 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1213-14.
[Vol. 79
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ance" and therefore not within the Boys Markets holding, or, that
where the dispute is the legality of the sympathy strike itself, there
is an arbitrable dispute and the Boys Markets rationale applies."8
It has been suggested that the lack of rational analysis of the
policies underlying the application of these phrases has contrib-
uted to confusion over when injunctive relief is appropriate."8 In
any event, a solution to this puzzle was finally provided when the
Supreme Court decided Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers
of America.7"
When the office-clerical and technical employees of the Buf-
falo Forge Company went on strike during contract negotiations,
they set up picket lines which were honored by the company's
production and maintenance employees, who were represented by
the United Steelworkers of America. The company brought suit
under § 301(a) of the LMRA, seeking to enjoin the work stoppage
by the production and maintenance employees, alleging that the
strike violated the no-strike clause of the contract between the
parties, and that the dispute as to the legality of the contract was
subject to the arbitration provisions in the contract.7 The district
court found that the employees were engaged in a sympathy strike
and held that the case did not fall within the holding of Boys
Markets because the strike was not over an arbitrable grievance,"
and the court of appeals affirmed this result and rationale.13 Writ-
ing for a Supreme Court majority of five, Justice White framed the
issue as "whether a federal court may enjoin a sympathy strike
pending the arbitrator's decision as to whether the strike is forbid-
den by the express no-strike clause contained in the collective
bargaining contract to which the striking union is a party."74 The
Court affirmed the decisions of the courts below,75 with both the
11 See cases cited in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 96
S. Ct. 3141 n.9 (1976).
11 Applicability of Injunctions, supra note 13, at 129-30. But see NAPA Pitts-
burgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 324-33 (3d Cir.)
(Hunter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
70 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
1' Id. at 3143-44. Like most of the collective bargaining agreements in previous
cases cited, the agreement at issue provided for arbitration of disputes as to the
meaning and application of the terms of the agreement.
72 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 386 F. Supp. 405
(W.D.N.Y. 1974).
13 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 517 F.2d 1207, 1210 (2d
Cir. 1975).
1, 96 S. Ct. at 3143.
71 Id. at 3146.
10
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majority and dissenting opinions echoing the arguments of Boys
Markets.
The Court recognized that the dispute as to the legality of the
sympathy strike was an arbitrable issue, and that a court could
enjoin the strike had an arbitrator previously ruled that the strike
was in breach of the contract." The Court then distinguished Boys
Markets and thus illuminated the meaning of that case, particu-
larly the "over an arbitrable grievance" rationale. The "driving
force" behind Boys Markets was the promotion of the preferred
methods of private, voluntary dispute settlement. It was deemed
necessary to accommodate the anti-injunction provisions of § 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act to § 301 of the LMRA only to the extent
necessary to implement the preferred policy. This meant that the
quid pro quo for the arbitration provisions was the union's promise
not to strike over any dispute subject to settlement by arbitra-
tion.17 Where the alleged violation of the no-strike clause was a
sympathy strike, then "the strike was not over any dispute be-
tween the Union and the employer that was even remotely subject
to the arbitration provisions of the contract. . . .The strike had
neither the purpose nor the effect of denying or evading an obliga-
tion to arbitrate or of depriving the employer of his bargain." 8
Because the strike did not have the purpose or effect of undermin-
ing the arbitration process, there was no need to accommodate § 4
to § 301.71
The Court also stated that the strike was not enjoinable
merely because it was an alleged violation of the express no-strike
clause in the contract." The Court incorporated the Sinclair dis-
sent's position that:
'[Tihere is no general federal anti-strike policy; and although
a suit may be brought under § 301 against strikes which, while
they are breaches of private contracts, do not threaten any addi-
tional public policy, in such cases the anti-injunction policy of
Norris-LaGuardia should prevail.'8'
Although the legality of the sympathy strike was arbitrable,
it did not follow that a court could enjoin the strike pending the
7, Id.
Id. at 3147.
78 Id.
7' Id. at 3147-49.
Id. at 3148.
Id., quoting 370 U.S. 195, 225 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 79
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arbitrator's decision. The Court reasoned that to allow an injunc-
tion to issue on the facts of this case would mean that a court could
"enjoin any other alleged breach of contract pending the exhaus-
tion of the applicable grievance and arbitration provisions ... "I'
even though to do so would violate express terms of § 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. This would have the practical effect of
making
the courts potential participants in a wide range of arbitrable
disputes ... not just for the purpose of enforcing promises to
arbitrate. . but for the purpose of preliminarily dealing with
the merits of the factual and legal issues that are subjects for
the arbitrator and of issuing injunctions that would otherwise
be forbidden by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 3
This would cut deeply into the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
and would go far beyond the scope of the accommodation required
by Boys Markets."' Such preliminary judicial determinations
would usurp the arbitrator's function, or at least inhibit his inde-
pendence in making a subsequent decision on the same issues. 5
Further, the Court recognized that injunctions against strikes,
even temporary injunctions, often have the effect of permanently
settling the issue."
Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Powell. Emphasizing that the prom-
ise not to strike is the quid pro quo for the employer's agreement
to contractual arbitration provisions, the dissent phrased the issue
as "whether that quid pro quo is severable into two parts-one
which a fedeial court may enforce by injunction and another which
it may not." 7 The dissent viewed the majority opinion as based
upon a literal interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and fear
that federal courts could be brought into a great deal of injunction
litigation and a consequent usurpation of the arbitrator's func-
tions."' It was contended that a proper application of the policies
underlying Boys Markets would require enforcement of the prom-
ise not to strike, as the quid pro quo," and it was also believed that
11 Id. at 3148.
93 Id. at 3149.
, Id. at 3148-49.
Id. at 3149.
, Id.
" Id. at 3150 (Stevens, J., dissenting opinion).
'Id.
'7 Id.
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Buffalo Forge did not raise the central concerns of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, as that act was primarily concerned with the pro-
cesses by which collective bargaining agreements are formed rather
than the means by which they are enforced." Boys Markets was
perceived by the dissent as emphasizing the no-strike promise as
the quid pro quo for arbitration agreements, which, when rendered
enforceable in federal courts, would greatly further the federal
labor policy of peaceful settlement of industrial disputes.'" It fol-
lowed that the dissent believed the Court was wrong in stating that
the strike in this case could not have had the effect of denying the
employer his bargain. Whether the employer was deprived of his
bargain depended upon "the extent of the certainty that the sym-
pathy strike [fell] within the no-strike clause."9
The dissenters argued that because a court could enforce an
arbitrator's ruling that a sympathy strike was in violation of a
contractual no-strike obligation, a court should have the authority
to enjoin a strike, pending the arbitrator's decision, when the
agreement is "so plainly unambiguous that there could be no bona
fide issue to submit to the arbitrator. . . ."" It was argued that,
by definition, an interim determination of the scope of the no-
strike clause "neither usurps nor precludes a decision by the arbi-
trator."9 The dissent noted that the damage remedy was often a
worthless substitute for injunctive relief,95 and that denial of the
injunction pending arbitration, when the strike does violate the
contract, can be as detrimental to the interests of the employer as
erroneous issuance of the injunction when the strike is not a viola-
tion of the agreement. The dissent saw this as true because
"postponement of a sympathy strike pending an arbitrator's clari-
fication of the no-strike clause [would] not critically impair the
vital interests of the striking local even if the right to strike [was]
upheld, and [would] avoid the costs of interrupted production if
the arbitrator [concluded] that the no-strike clause [applied]."9
" Id. at 3151-52.
" Id. at 3152, 3155.
o2 Id. at 3152-53. The dissent noted that an employer will often agree to manda-
tory arbitration provisions only in exchange for a no-strike commitment which
extends beyond the strikes over arbitrable grievances. See Feller, A General Theory
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAuF. L. Rav. 663, 757-60 (1973).
13 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3156 (Stevens, J., dissenting opinion).
" Id. at 3157.
S Id. at 3152, n.8.
, Id. at 3157-58. "A sympathy strike does not directly further the economic
interests of the members of the striking local or contribute to the resolution of any
[Vol. 79
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While recognizing that the Norris-LaGuardia Act "cannot be in-
terpreted to immunize the union from all risk of an erroneously
issued injunction," the dissent believed that the proper procedure
would be for district courts to issue injuActions only after presenta-
tion of "convincing evidence that the strike is clearly within the
no-strike clause." 97
The great importance of the holding in Buffalo Forge is that
it defines the extent of the exception to the anti-injunction provi-
sion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act established in Boys Markets, and
it thereby clarifies what role the federal courts are to play in the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. It appears cer-
tain that the holding of Boys Markets is to be narrowly construed.
The only time an injunction is authorized"8 is when there is a
collective bargaining agreement which contains a no-strike
clause,9 the dispute leading to the work stoppage is over an arbitr-
able grievance, and the normal principles of equity are applicable.
This formula must be read to mean that not only must the work
stoppage be a breach of the contract, but the work stoppage also
must have the effect of subverting the arbitration process. This is
just another way of stating the requirement of "over an arbitrable
grievance." The arbitrable grievance must be the cause of the
strike, not merely a result of it.
These criteria can be applied to varying situations to deter-
mine if a Boys Markets injunction is authorized. A Boys Markets
injunction is clearly inappropriate in a "political strike" situation
in which employees refuse to work, in violation of a no-strike
clause, in order to express political sentiments. This situation is
illustrated by examples from the coal industry in which miners
have struck in order to exert influence for passage of black-lung
legislation, protest state law banning use of studded tires, and
protest a state governor's order regulating distribution of gaso-
line.' There is no subversion of the arbitration process in these
dispute between that local, or its members, and the employer." Id. at 3157 (footnote
omitted).
" Id. at 3158 (footnote omitted).
" See text accompanying note 54, supra.
" The no-strike clause may be either express or implied, but in the event of a
sympathy strike situation, there will be no implied no-strike clause upon which to
issue an injunction. See 96 S. Ct. at 3155 & n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting opinion).
'1 E.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975). There is a potential problem lurking in a
strict definitional application of the term "political strike." It is possible that what
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fact situations,'0 ' because the strike is not caused by an arbitrable
grievance; it is not a dispute between employer and employees
which could be resolved by arbitration.
Buffalo Forge teaches that a Boys Markets injunction is im-
proper in the typical sympathy strike situation in which there is a
collective bargaining agreement which contains a general no-strike
clause. This is true even if the agreement also contains a general
provision that any disputes as to the interpretation and applica-
tion of the contract terms are to be resolved by arbitration. This
was the exact situation in Buffalo Forge, and as indicated in that
case, an injunction was improper because the underlying dispute
was not subject to resolution by arbitration. Therefore, although
the work stoppage resulted in an arbitrable grievance, i.e., whether
a sympathy strike was a violation of the no-strike agreement, it
was not the underlying cause of the strike. The underlying cause
of the strike was not any dispute which the employees had with
their employer; the cause of the stoppage was the employees' deci-
sion to honor the picket line of another union. This situation may
be contrasted with a sympathy strike in violation of a no-strike
clause which expressly waives the right of employees to honor a
picket line of another union. Such an express waiver in a collective
bargaining agreement could serve to bring the strike activity
within the scope of Boys Markets by immediately rendering any
sympathy strike also a dispute with the employer which would
clearly be arbitrable. If the contract language was properly phrased
to express that the right to engage in sympathy strikes, or any
other sort of work stoppage, was clearly waived, or waived pending
prior decision of an arbitrator, then the effect of such a strike
would be to evade and subvert the arbitration process. The effect
would be to color the underlying dispute as one over contract terms
subject to arbitration, and so Boys Markets would apply.
This proposed analysis of the varying applications of the Boys
Markets rule to sympathy strike situations may appear to be overly
semantic, but the distinction is a function of, and required by
certain basic principles of federal labor policy. One of these princi-
ples is that the anti-injunction provision of the Norris-LaGuardia
begins as a dispute over an arbitrable grievance, and is enjoinable, may at some
point become motivated by "political" factors. An example of this is a strike over
an arbitrable grievance which becomes a strike over the "right to strike."
01 This is assuming that the collective bargaining agreements do not expressly
address the right to engage in this nature of strike.
[Vol. 79
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Act is not merely an historical anomaly, but a vital law which will
be abrogated only when necessary to vindicate some other policy
in the scheme of federal labor law. The policy favoring voluntary
collective bargaining and resolution of industrial disputes through
arbitration is the one policy of sufficient importance to require an
accommodation of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Another such
policy, implicit in Buffalo Forge, is a recognition of the importance
to workers of the right to strike and, while this right may be
waived,"' such waiver should be explicitly stated.' 3 Accommoda-
tion of the policies favoring arbitration and inhibiting federal in-
junctive relief in labor disputes, most clearly illustrated in Boys
Markets, was consistently and appropriately applied in Buffalo
Forge. 104
An employer's need and desire for a contract which provides
for uninterrupted production is a worthy and understandable
objective. 0 5 What the Court has done in Buffalo Forge is not to
,02 NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
11 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
,01 This is not to say that unresolved problems do not remain. There may be
particular problems in the bituminous coal industry where there is an ironclad
tradition among miners of refusing to cross picket lines in virtually any circum-
stance. See Consol. Coal v. International Union, United Mine Workers, 537 F.2d
1226, 1230 (4th Cir. 1976). This tradition, coupled with a propensity for local unions
which strike (whether or not over an arbitrable grievance) to send out "roving
pickets" can lead to the situation where a local union striking over an arbitrable
grievance sends out roving pickets to neighboring mines. The workers at the non-
striking mines will invariably observe the picket line. The same situation could
possibly come about even where the workers at the mine do not strike their own
employer over a grievance dispute, but instead send pickets to neighboring mines,
thus forcing a sympathy strike on the other miners.
In Consol. Coal v. International Union, United Mine Workers, supra, stranger
pickets appeared at the employer's mine and the picket line was observed by Con-
sol's employees. Recognizing that they had no dispute with their own employees,
Consol attempted, inter alia, to enjoin the activities of the stranger pickets (it was
not clear to the Court just whom the stranger pickets represented). The court of
appeals held that the employer in this situation could not enjoin the stranger
pickets because the employer had no such right based in contract with the stranger
pickets, no grievance mechanism with them, and therfore a Boys Markets injunc-
tion was not applicable. Id. at 1230. This case interpreted the National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement of 1974.
See also United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 418 F. Supp. 174
(W.D. Pa. 1976); Brief for Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n., Inc. as Amicus Cur-
iae at 5, 6, Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 96 S. Ct. 3141
(1976).
'" 96 S. Ct., at 3157 (Stevens, J., dissenting opinion). See Brief for Petitioner
at 20, Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976);
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deprive employers of this goal, but to put parties to collective
bargaining agreements on notice that they should strive for clarity
of intent and expression in contract terms. They are free to bargain
for whatever terms they may be able to agree upon. In a society in
which political and economic freedom are basic values, the Su-
preme Court has decided that the courts should attempt to limit
their role in resolution of industrial disputes to ascertaining and
enforcing the clearly expressed agreement of the parties.
S. Benjamin Bryant
Brief for Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 2, Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
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